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Abstract
Sexual minorities in Poland are excluded from the tradi-
tional understanding of “Polishness” premised on conserva-
tive, Catholic values. This article examines how ethnic
Polish citizens who identify as non-heteronormative navi-
gate their relationship to “Polishness” at a moment of
heightened nationalism. Through 31 interviews with Polish
sexual minorities, I show that while national identification is
a struggle for some sexual minorities, others work to
reframe what “Polishness” means to them. I argue for fur-
ther research examining the ways that stigmatised members
of the ethnic majority—what I term ideological others—
understand and navigate their relationship to national iden-
tity. The study contributes to the literature on everyday
nationhood and national identity by attending to national
identification among stigmatised members of the ethnic
majority.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Research on nationhood and national identification(s) has moved from examining the construction of the “nation”
through elite narratives, discourses, and events (Berezin, 1997; Olick, 1998; Spillman, 1997; Zubrzycki, 2006) to
probing how common, ordinary individuals understand and interpret the nation and national identity (Bonikowski,
2016; Fox & Miller-Idriss, 2008; Hearn, 2007; Kiely, McCrone, & Bechhofer, 2006). Such studies have been helpful
in showing the extent to which national identities are evoked in everyday interactions in addition to demonstrating
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when, whether, and why such identities matter (Brubaker et.al 2006; Fenton, 2007; McCrone & Bechhofer, 2015;
Skey, 2010). Yet despite the importance of such findings, scholars studying everyday nationhood and national identi-
fication have yet to attend to the experiences of what I refer to as ideological others:2 members of the ethnic majority
who are symbolically cast as outsiders and/or threats to the nation due to their lack of conformity to prevailing
national ideals. For example, and as this paper will demonstrate, while Polish sexual minorities are undeniably ethnic
Poles, they are often framed in public narratives as threats to the status quo of Catholic Poland and thus are not
“truly Polish” due to their sexual orientation.
There is, of course, a long tradition of research that has examined the intersection of nationalism and sexuality
(Bunzl, 2004; Graff, 2010; Mosse, 1985; Parker, 1992). However, it has tended to focus on the ways in which non-
normative sexualities are construed and constructed as incompatible with the “nation” through policies and dis-
course. Less research has been conducted on how sexual minorities themselves understand and navigate their rela-
tionship to national identity given such exclusion. The primary point of this paper is thus to extend research on
everyday nationhood and national identification by focusing on the experiences of sexual minorities. I am also argu-
ing that more research ought to be conducted that focuses squarely on the ways in which sexual minorities and
other ideological others navigate their relationship(s) with national identity.3
My interviews with 31 Polish sexual minorities reveal the myriad ways in which members of this ethnically
included yet socially stigmatised community understand what it means to be Polish. I find that while some respon-
dents struggled to identify with their national identity, such struggles are not necessarily determined by their sexual
orientation. Other respondents were able to more easily identify with their “Polishness,” but not because they identi-
fied with prevailing conservative notions of Polish national identity. Rather, it is because they engaged in a process I
refer to as reframing, in which they redefined what “Polishness” meant to them in their own terms. Reframing, I
argue, is an important strategy by which sexual minorities can find meaning and belonging in their national identity
despite a political climate that marks them as enemies of the nation.4 In addition to reframing, other respondents
were able to more easily and comfortably identify with their “Polishness” because they also embraced a cosmopoli-
tan identity.
Before continuing, however, it is important to clarify precisely what is and what is not being claimed here. Pri-
marily, I am not arguing nor trying to demonstrate that national identification for Polish sexual minorities is harder
and/or easier because of their sexual orientation. In other words, I do not present a causal argument in which I claim
that sexual minorities in Poland feel more or less Polish because of their sexual orientation. While one interview sub-
ject discussed the ways in which his national identification has changed as he came to terms with being gay, national
identification is often too complex of a process to understand as being impacted by any one variable (i.e., one's com-
ing to terms with their sexual orientation). The primary purpose of this article is therefore to demonstrate the pro-
cesses of national identification among members of a stigmatised community that is also part of the ethnic majority.
In the conclusion, I will discuss ways in which such research can be extended to move beyond the current case.
In the following sections, I discuss and critically analyse the everyday nationhood literature and literature that
has examined the relationship between nationalism and sexuality. I then move to discuss the interviews, in which I
examine the extent to which, and the ease with which, sexual minorities in Poland identify with their Polishness.
2 | EVERYDAY NATIONHOOD, NATIONALISM, AND SEXUALITY
The everyday nationhood perspective seeks to understand nationalism and national identities not as things existing
in the world but as perspectives on and ways of seeing the world (Brubaker, Loveman, & Stamatov, 2004; Fox &
Miller-Idriss, 2008). Such research departs from scholarship in which the primary focal point of analysis is the forma-
tion and diffusion of the nation-state as a macro-political formation (Anderson, 1983; Gellner, 2008; Wimmer &
Feinstein, 2010). Yet as Jon Fox and Cynthia Miller-Idriss (2008) have emphasised, in addition to being understood
as the result of macro-level dynamics, nationhood is also something that is practically accomplished in everyday
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interactions and situations in the lives of average national citizens. The focus on nationhood and national identity
among ordinary members of the nation—how and the extent to which people think about and with the nation—has
therefore become a central and fruitful endeavour for many scholars studying nationalism in recent years
(Bonikowski, 2016; Fenton, 2007; Phillips & Smith, 2000; Skey, 2010; Thompson, 2001).
A key example of this approach is Rogers Brubaker and colleagues' account of national identity and “everyday
ethnicity” among Hungarians and Romanians in Cluj, Transylvania (Brubaker, Feischmidt, Fox, & Grancea, 2006).
Through in-depth interviews and ethnographic fieldwork, they found that the nationalistic rhetoric of political entre-
preneurs was seldom salient to those they interviewed and observed. Such observations led them to conclude that
the ways in which people think “with” the nation may not have much to do with how the nation is constructed in
elite discourse by political entrepreneurs. Cynthia Miller-Idriss (2006, 2009) took a similar approach in her empirical
work comparing levels of national identification among German vocational schoolteachers and their students.
Through interviews and ethnographic observation, she found that while older generations were still averse to the
notion of German nationalism due to its association with Nazism, their students were more likely to embrace their
national identities as a source of strength and pride. Generational differences, then, played a major role in citizens'
national identifications.
In the British case, Michael Skey (2010) showed how an individual's strong attachment to their nation and
national identity can provide what he, following Anthony Giddens (1991), calls a sense of ontological security. This
taken-for-granted sense of national belonging is particularly salient, Skey argues, in times of economic and social
unrest (2010, p. 731). Finally, Fenton (2007) demonstrated that many of the British youths he interviewed showed
indifference to the idea of having a British or English identity. Such findings led him to argue that national identity
may not be as important as some scholars (cf. Calhoun, 1997; Greenfeld & Chirot, 1994) make it out to be. Overall,
research on everyday nationhood has been helpful in elucidating the myriad ways in which the members of a
national community understand national identity and their relationship to it, as well as the significance of it in their
day-to-day lives. Yet despite the valuable insights of the everyday nationhood tradition, it has not explicitly focused
on the ways in which sexual and other ideological others navigate their relationship with national identity.
There is, however, a robust body of scholarship that has emphasised the relationship between sexuality and the
nation. One of the exemplars of this tradition is George Mosse, who in Nationalism and Sexuality (1985) explicitly
placed dominant visions of sexuality at the forefront of his theory of nationalism. Mosse demonstrated how the rise
of the modern nation-state entailed a politics of respectability (1985, p. 4), which categorised homosexuality (seen as
the antithesis of the “manliness” needed to forge strong nations) as threatening to the nation. Yet Mosse's take on
the relationship between nationalism and sexuality centred on the creation of a politics of respectability and the for-
mation of social norms concerning sexuality and less on how sexual minorities themselves understand their relation-
ship to the nation and national identity. His focus, therefore, was more on the creation of national norms through the
construction of sexual others rather than on the navigation of national identity by those others.
Much research mining the intersections of nationalism and sexuality has followed in Mosse's footsteps and dem-
onstrated the significant role that sexual and gendered norms have played in the formation of exclusionary forms of
nationalism. An early take on the relationship between nationalism and sexuality came in a collected volume of case
studies written by comparative literary scholars (Parker, 1992). This collection of essays discussed the various ways
in which gender and sexuality tie into nation-building projects in various national contexts. The contributing authors
discussed (among other things) how literatures, fashions, and films helped solidify certain ideas of what the relation-
ship between the nation and sexuality ought to be. This early work examining the relationship(s) between national-
ism and sexuality thus clearly showed how national values—particularly how they relate to sexuality—are
communicated clearly through various modes of art and culture.
Similarly, a number of feminist scholars (Yuval-Davis, 1993; McClintock, 1995; Nagel, 1998) have argued that
narratives of masculinity, gender, and sexuality, particularly those that celebrate patriotic masculinity and the
woman's roles as the exalted mother of the nation, have been essential to nearly all national projects. Such narratives
frame the ways in which people understand how to belong to their given national community, as well as what ought
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to be considered deviant from and hazardous to the status quo of the nation. Building on these studies, Sam Pryke
(1998) argued for a more robust conceptualisation of the relationship between nationalism and sexuality, suggesting
three focal points for scholarship: national sexual stereotypes, the role of sexuality in national conflict, and the role
of sexuality in nation building.
These earlier studies then helped set the stage for more empirical work that mined the relationship between
nationalism and sexuality in specific national contexts. Through in-depth archival research, Matti Bunzl (2004)
showed both how sexual minorities and Jews served as outsiders, which the newly reconstructed Austrian nation
strived to define itself against, and how these communities began to advocate for themselves in the public sphere in
the latter part of the 20th century. More recently, Richard Mole (2011, 2016) has examined how what he refers to
as “political homophobia” operates in the Central and Eastern Europe. Mole's research has demonstrated the ways in
which politicians in Latvia, Serbia, and Russia have instrumentally used homophobic discourses to frame homosexual-
ity and homosexuals as foreign threats to the nation (2016, p. 111). These discourses, Mole argues, serve to reinforce
the idea that homosexuality is a foreign import—an unwelcome consequence of Europeanisation—that can and
should be resisted. Thus, in the Latvian case, some politicians have gone so far as to claim that homosexuality did
not exist in their country until joining the European Union (EU).5
Similar themes have also been explored in scholarship focusing on Poland. In Section 2.1, I will describe some
important context regarding the Polish case before reviewing the ways in which scholars have examined the relation-
ship between nationalism and (homo)sexuality in Poland. I will then proceed to my analysis.
2.1 | Sexual minorities and Polish national identity
In contemporary Poland, sexual minorities are increasingly excluded from articulations of national identity that are
promoted by conservative, nationalist groups. This prevailing notion of Polish identity is based on a national mythol-
ogy that envisions Poland as an essentially Catholic nation whose mission is “defending Europe against the infidel
(however defined)” (Zubrzycki, 2011, p. 55). In this struggle, the primary axis of disagreement centres on whether
Poland should embrace the more liberal and progressive “Western” values embodied by the EU or remain tied to tra-
ditional, conservative, and nationalistic understandings of Polish national identity. On the right, there is a highly con-
servative faction that is intimately tied to the Church and stands in staunch opposition to the directives of the EU.
This group opposes the EU primarily because they see it as a corrupt Western institution that is trying to enforce
certain norms and values that are contrary to the traditional values of Poland, namely Catholicism and traditional
family models (Gaisbauer, 2007; Machaj & Białas-Zielinska, 2014; Porter, 2001). The proponents of this vision there-
fore believe that Polish national identity ought to be tied to the Church and to traditional social norms and values
(Davies, 1997; Zubrzycki, 2006). On the left stands the pro-EU, progressive and liberal faction, which believes that
Poland's national identity should promote pluralism and openness.
At the core of this cleavage, then, is a battle over Polish national identity, between maintaining tradition and
embracing progressive social changes (Koczanowicz, 2014; Mach, 2007). Recent manifestations of the national
mythology just discussed posit sexual minorities as one of the primary threats to Polish national identity,6 as they are
often understood as being representative of the progressive ideologies that stand in firm opposition to traditional
Polish values that are deeply rooted in conservative Catholicism.
This is not to say, however, that sexual minorities and Polishness are framed as mutually exclusive at all
times and in all contexts. As Łucasz Szulc (2011) has pointed out, it is not sexual minorities in general that are
criticised but those who openly demonstrate and celebrate their diversity. The issue, therefore, is not with one's
sexual orientation but with their queerness. This observation then leads Szulc to claim that while Poland may be
open to tolerating sexual minorities (insofar as they keep to themselves and assimilate to the heterosexual status
quo), it is still far from being open to accepting their queerness (2011, pp. 170–171). Nor is it to claim that reli-
gion is always seen as antithetical to queerness or that all sexual minorities in Poland are hostile towards
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Catholicism. Indeed, there is a prominent organisation in Poland known as “Faith and Rainbow” (Wiara i Tęcza)
that advocates on behalf of sexual minorities that also maintain strong religious faith and dedication to the Cath-
olic Church.7 The intersection of (homo)sexuality, religion, and Polishness is therefore quite complex. However,
the primary point I wish to underline here is that for the Church and the Polish far right the issue is what sexual
minorities—to them—represent, a deviation from and threat to conservative, Catholic values that are understood
as the immutable pillars of Polishness.
Given this reality, a number of Polish scholars have written about the ways in which Polish nationalism has spe-
cifically targeted sexual minorities. In a series of essays, Agnieszka Graff (2006, 2009, 2010) examined how national-
istic discourses in Poland are not only strongly gendered but also laden with derogatory references to non-
heteronormative sexualities. The various “political uses of homophobia,” she argues, came in the wake of Poland's
EU accession and have served as a means by which nationalistic Poles can draw firm boundaries between what is
“truly Polish” and what is simply an undesirable European import (Graff, 2010). Among these undesirable imports are
LGBT and “gender ideologies,” which nationalists believe pose a grave threat to traditional Polish values (Graff,
2010, p. 585).
In another insightful study, Adam Ostolski (2007) compared right wing periodicals from the pre-war and con-
temporary eras to show that the discourses of exclusion operated similarly against Jews in the 1930s as they do
now against sexual minorities. His analysis demonstrated how both groups were characterised as “conspirators,
corruptors, and pariahs,” and, similar to Graff, Ostolski argued that the logics of anti-Semitism and homophobia
in Poland share a similar structure. More recently, Robert Kulpa's discursive analysis of a speech given by
Jarosław Kaczynski, the leader of the conservative Law and Justice party, revealed that sexual minorities are also
often construed as an “enemy within” Polish borders (2019, p. 12). Such research has thus been important in
unveiling the ways that the far right in Poland talk about sexual minorities in relation to the nation, and much
like the research in other national contexts, it tends to underline the idea that non-heteronormative sexualities
are very often framed as foreign threats (be they internal or external) to the well-being of the nation. Yet in all
of these studies, the analytic focus rests on the construction of sexualities and sexual others through policies and
discourses, and not on how members of these constructed categories (Brubaker et al., 2004) interpret and under-
stand their relationship to national identity.
A number of scholars, however, have also focused more directly on the experiences and actions of Polish
sexual minorities. In a recent examination of the websites of several LGBTQ organisations in Poland and Tur-
key, Łukasz Szulc (2016) argued that by utilising national symbols in conjunction with those of the LGBT com-
munity, these groups engaged in the practice of “domesticating the nation online.” Utilising Billig's (1995)
concept of “banal nationalism,” Szulc demonstrated that many of these organisations, though not self-
consciously nationalistic, still engage in banal “flaggings” of the nation on their webpages. Although many of
these websites still tended to “reaffirm the world as a world of nations” (Szulc, 2016, p. 318), they would also
queer national symbols, thereby attempting to make the nation a more hospitable and inclusive space for queer
identities. Yet while Szulc's study usefully shifted focus from discourses about the LGBT+ community to the
actions of LGBT+ groups, his primary emphasis was on the organisational level and not the micro-level experi-
ences of sexual minorities.
Some research has, however, specifically relied on in-depth interviews in order to examine the experiences of
Polish sexual minorities. Joanna Mizielinska's (2001) study of Polish lesbians included both a critical discursive analy-
sis of Polish nationalist discourse and interviews with Polish lesbians. However, her interviews were primarily
focused on these women's relationship to the Church and Catholicism, not how they navigated their sexual and
national identities. Similarly, Gregory Czarnecki's (2006) interview-based study showed how the experiences of dis-
crimination of both Polish Jews and sexual minorities led to similar feelings of being “in the closet.” Yet his study was
primarily focused on the comparative experiences of Polish sexual minorities and Jews and thus did not take as its
primary departure point the ways in which Polish sexual minorities interpret and navigate their relationship to
national identity. The latter is the primary focus of this paper.
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3 | DATA AND METHODS
The primary data source for this study is 31 in-depth, semi-structured interviews conducted with Polish sexual
minorities between March and June of 2017. The interviews were conducted both in Polish and English, depending
on the respondent's level of fluency with English. In order to allow for the most direct and honest responses, the
researcher only conducted interviews in English if respondents felt comfortable expressing themselves and talking
about intimate subject matter in their non-native language. When interviews were conducted in English, the
researcher let respondents know that they could switch to Polish if they felt it necessary to better express them-
selves. Given that the researcher speaks Polish conversationally but not fluently, interviews conducted in Polish were
recorded, transcribed, and translated from Polish to English by a transcription service.
Initial respondents were recruited through an advertisement on the website of the Campaign Against Homopho-
bia (KPH), Poland's largest LGBT rights organisation. Following other scholars studying nationhood and national iden-
tity among “ordinary” individuals (Condor, 2000; Miller-Idriss & Rothenberg, 2012; Phillips & Smith, 2000), my
solicitation was focused on recruiting average Polish citizens, the only specified criteria for interview subjects being
that they are Polish citizens, over the age of 18, and that they identify as either, gay, lesbian, or bisexual. Those who
responded to my advertisement then helped me find other willing participants.
Given the broad criteria, the characteristics of respondents varied greatly. Twenty-one were male and 10 were
female. The youngest was 19, and the oldest was 64. They spanned a wide range of careers, from artists and com-
puter programmers to lawyers and educators, and nearly all of them were highly educated or pursuing higher educa-
tion. Although some respondents were in some way affiliated with an LGBT rights, NGOs, or similar organisations in
their city, only one was formally employed by such an organisation. Only four respondents were regularly involved in
LGBT activism or advocacy. While the majority of interviews were held in Krakow, I also conducted interviews in
Warsaw, Wroclaw, and Poznan. Interviews lasted an average of 75 min, but ranged from 1 to 3 hr, and consisted of
very few formal questions. The focal point of each interview was on the idea of Polishness, or what it meant to be
Polish, and the extent to which each respondent felt Polish and identified with a Polish national identity. Respon-
dents were also asked to describe the prototypical Polish citizen, as well as to describe and characterise current polit-
ical issues in Poland.
3.1 | Struggles over national identification
A number of interview subjects struggled to identify with their Polishness. Such difficulties were evident in my con-
versation with Beata, a 38-year-old translator living outside Warsaw. Beata, now divorced, was once married to a
man and has two young children. She confided to me that she has always had a sense of being “different,” yet given
her strict Catholic upbringing, it was not until her late 20s that she could truly understand why.
So, I was - in my - my family was very, very Catholic. We lived with my grandma since I was six. I was an
only child, and basically my grandma set the rules. So I was forced to go to church and to pray every day
and I just took it as whatever it was. It was my life … so, I did not really entertain the thought of different
sexuality or sexual orientation … . I remember in high school, I really had a big crush on my English
teacher who was a female, and my friends -- my girlfriends -- they actually had a nickname for me which
basically meant a lesbian. I was so ashamed and so angry at them, I completely did not associate myself
with being a lesbian at all. I just didn't see -- I just liked the teacher, but nothing else.
Although her narrative began with reference to herself, “I,” Beata quickly changed the subject of the conversa-
tion from herself to her family. This hesitation suggests that the sense of religiosity felt in her youth was not some-
thing embraced independently, but rather something imposed upon her that she had to consciously work to separate
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herself from. Yet even several years later, her immediate response was to state that she was religious in her early life.
Beata's statement regarding her former crush on a female English teacher is also telling. Although she was feeling
strong emotions towards her instructor, in her mind, the idea that her attraction might have been stemming from her
sexual orientation did not occur to her. Instead, she was simply left with confusing emotions, as her strict religious
upbringing and the pressures of peer ridicule precluded her from even entertaining the idea that she might be a les-
bian. Our conversation then shifted towards her feelings regarding Poland and what Polish national identity meant
to her.
I: From your understanding, what does it meant to be Polish?
R: Right now, right now, I do feel Polish. The fact is that I criticise my government, my country, a lot,
but I'm allowed to do it … So, that's my sort of being Polish. But to tell you the truth, any sort of
patriotic feelings are being hijacked by extreme nationalist groups. And it's almost, it's almost shame-
ful for me to carry a Polish flag, or to have any sort of Polish symbols on my clothes, because that's
basically what I associate with hooligans … I had a friend from Brazil who lived here with me for
eight months, and she wanted to get something typically Polish. They had baseball caps with the Pol-
ish emblem and she asked me to buy one for her and I refused. I said, “Absolutely not. You're not
going to be wearing that because this basically is being associated with so many things that we both
were against.”With xenophobia, with homophobia, with anti-Semitism, with any sort of basic phobia
to anything that is a little bit different.
The first four words of Beata's statement here are telling. Although she claims to feel Polish right now, the impli-
cation here is that her subjective sense of Polishness is not a given. A consistent sense of national identity, which
some argue can be essential to feelings of ontological security (Skey, 2010) appears to be absent. Although she
claimed to still feel Polish and thus did not fully eschew her national identity, Beata's identification with Polishness
took some justification.
Further, according to Beata, traditional Polish symbols had been hijacked and transformed into icons of extrem-
ism. For her, the symbols being discussed—Polish baseball caps with the national emblem—carried with them the idea
that being Polish meant being a hostile, xenophobic nationalist, and therefore they were seen as offensive and alien-
ating. Yet her Brazilian friend, who did not understand these products as being associated with such exclusionary
ideals, instead simply saw them as mere souvenirs. Beata therefore noted a sense of shame that accompanied the
utilisation of traditional Polish symbols that are accompanied by feelings of patriotism and national pride. Yet for her,
any involvement with national symbols given their association with far right nationalism—be it carrying a flag or
wearing a “patriotic” article of clothing—could be understood as an assault on her sexual identity, one that was at
odds with prevailing articulations of Polish national identity.
Waldek, a 30-year old artist living in Krakow, told me something similar.
I: What, in your view then, does it mean to be Polish?
W: Um to be honest, I never, I never felt … okay, I know that I'm Polish and I live here, but I never
felt like, I'm not a nationalist person, let's say. I'm not nationalist, there's a better word … I'm not
patriotic. Because I don't … I would like to be. I really would like to be, and I would like to be
proud of my country. I would like to, I don't know, feel that I want to fight for my country, but I
don't, because I don't have any reason to do that.
This sentiment is telling, as it implies that despite some yearning to feel strongly Polish, Waldek has been unable to
find any justification to do so. Even though the initial question was about what, in general, it meant to be Polish, his
response did not address this inquiry. Rather, Waldek immediately moved into a discussion of how he himself has never
felt a strong sense of Polish identity, even though he would like to feel, as he states, proud of his country. Although he
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did not articulate precisely why he struggled with his connection to Polishness, Waldek's decision to be so forthright
about disavowing any relation to nationalism and patriotism, despite his professed desire to be patriotic, implies a strong
sense of alienation from Polish national identity, an identity to which he cannot easily connect himself.
Karol, a 30-year-old travel agent and tour guide living in Krakow, expressed a similar sentiment in our
conversation.
I: In your view, what do you think it means to be Polish?
K: Right now, I'm really ashamed that I'm Polish, given what's been going on in the last couple of
months. So, it is also a difficult question and would have been definitely easier to respond to that
question a couple of years ago.
I: Do you think that your sexuality has anything to do with this?
K: To some extent, yes, but on the other hand, I still have friends who are not gay and they also see
it more or less the same way as I see it. I actually never really suffered much from being a member
of this oppressed minority, but still I think that in a lot of cases, it helped me to think in a more
positive way about other people. But, even if I was straight, I'd be seeing most of the cases more
or less the same way. But, it's also hard to say because I'm gay and am not straight and I will never
be straight.
Taken together, my conversations with Beata, Waldek, and Karol illustrate the sometimes alienating effects of
prevailing, conservative understandings of national identity for sexual minorities in Poland. Yet this is not to say, of
course, that it is simply because of their sexual orientations that they struggled to identify with Polishness, as there
are numerous possible explanations for why some people might experience difficulty feeling part of this collective,
national identity. It is certainly possible that a number of heterosexual Poles feel similar constraints, and as Karol
states, he has many heterosexual friends who feel the same way as him. Thus, while these individuals do indeed
struggle to identify with their Polishness, it would be hasty to claim that their sexuality is the driving force behind
these struggles. Instead, such cases demonstrate that sexuality may actually not play a major role in national (dis-)
identification for some sexual minorities, suggesting that while citizens with marginalised identities may indeed have
trouble identifying with their national identity, one cannot assume that such struggles are determined by the aspect
of themselves that is marginalised. As the cases of Beata, Waldek, and Karol demonstrate, such dis-identification
may be more circumstantial or tied to more general liberal leanings.
One respondent—Marcin, a 28-year-old computer programmer living in Warsaw—however, made it clear that
coming to terms with his sexuality did make it more difficult to identify as Polish.
M: From the start, I was raised like – maybe not like extremely to be focused on nationality, but gen-
erally, I was like – I would say I was patriotic, I was proud of my country, its achievements, and all
that comes with that. But, I've got to say that when the years went on and I was more aware of
the political situation, I was more aware of my own sexual identity [emphasis added], it's like I feel
that the right-wing extremists are really – they're like stealing, or like taking for themselves the
national symbols… they're supposed to be for everyone. I tend to identify national symbols with
them … so whenever I see a Polish flag, I like wonder is it going to be something about hating
gays or hating, I don't know, Muslims, or whatever. And it usually is, which is sad.
Marcin's emphasis on how his perceptions changed over time is important as it underscores his evolving under-
standing of what it means to be Polish. Further, it shows how, given these changes, the ease with which he could
identify with his Polishness has also changed. As he states, throughout his childhood, he was raised to be proud of
the various achievements of his country, and he therefore felt patriotic. Although not ardently focused on national-
ity, he could claim his Polish national identity with pride, and he therefore embraced national symbols. In these times,
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national symbols and the national identity they represented were reinforced by feelings of patriotism and pride, and
thus the national icons that symbolised these patriotic ideas were not seen as oppressive.
However, as he became more politically aware and, most importantly, conscious of his own sexual orientation,
Marcin's understanding of what it meant to be Polish, in addition to how easily he could identify with Polishness,
began to change. As his understanding evolved, national symbols and the national identity they buttressed were har-
der to imbue with positivity and pride and were increasingly interpreted as brands of far right nationalists, ones he
could no longer brandish. Identifying with his national identity, one that he claims he used to be proud of, therefore
became more difficult with time. While as a child Marcin's understanding of his Polish national identity brought with
it feelings of national pride and belonging, as he became more in touch with his sexual orientation, one that,
according to traditional Polish mythology is both a threat to Poland and in stark opposition to true Polishness, these
positive associations began to diminish. Marcin made this point even clearer in the following exchange.
I: Do you feel Polish in your daily life?
M: I'd say it definitely changed. I find myself not really associating myself with Poland that strongly. I
feel more like I was born here, but this country doesn't really care about me and I've got to say I
don't really care that much about this country, either. So, yeah, it changed. I remember that it
wasn't like that from the start. So, I guess just this constant reminder of not being equal to hetero-
sexual persons, I guess it made me just not really associate with that as much as I would normally do
or as I would like. It's still in the back of my head just to move out from Poland someday and live a
normal life in a country that would appreciate me for who I am [emphasis added].
Marcin's desire to identify as Polish has been hampered by the constant reminders that homosexuality and
Polishness are commonly framed as mutually exclusive categories. Given the widespread narratives that marked him
as being “less Polish” due to his sexual orientation, Marcin has grown increasingly alienated from his national identity.
This is particularly troubling for him because, as he states, he would like to associate himself more with Polishness.
However, the “constant reminder” of being an unequal part of the national community makes the process national
identification a far more difficult task.
Such struggles, however, were not unanimously felt among all respondents. In Section 3.2, I will discuss a strat-
egy that respondents have engaged, which I have named reframing, in order to make their relationship with Polish
national identity easier to navigate.
3.2 | Reframing Polishness
Although a number of respondents struggled to identify with their Polishness, to say that all respondents struggled
to the same degree would be an exaggeration. Some were able to avoid the same kinds of struggles that were evi-
dent with Beata, Marcin, Waldek, and Karol, but not because they identified with the traditional model of Polish
national identity. Rather, it was because they either reframed Polishness as being premised on more general and
inclusive criteria or reframed their own relationship to Polishness more generally, often by also identifying more
strongly with a cosmopolitan identity. The following excerpt from my conversation with Adam, a 20-year-old univer-
sity student and activist living in Poznan, is a clear example of the latter approach.
I: How would you describe or define what it means to be Polish?
A: So, I don't feel Polish. I think that I am cosmopolitan. But, some of the habits, some of the
traditions, some of the other schemes of behavior and of opinions and routines in my mind
are without question Polish … but I try to not to identify as a Polish person because I think
that it's too oppressive … I prefer to create a world without barriers, and I think that by
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doing that, or in wanting this world, I should refuse my Polish identity … but I don't want to
do that, yeah?
Like Waldek above, Adam is quick to answer the initial prompt by claiming that he does not feel Polish, even
though my question asked how he would define or describe what it means to be Polish. However, as he continues in
his response, it becomes clear that such a dissociation is not easy for him. As he states, there are basic mental
schemas and tendencies that, having grown up in Poland, are impossible to avoid. Therefore, in some ways, he is
“without question” Polish. However, despite these deeply engrained schemas, Adam also feels the need to actively
disengage from his Polish identity, as he believes it to be oppressive and contradictory to the barrier-free world he
envisions and desires. He therefore first and foremost identifies as cosmopolitan, while also acknowledging that he
does not desire to denounce his Polishness.
Thus, while identifying strictly as Polish might prove difficult for Adam, thinking of himself as also being cosmo-
politan is a strategy that gives him the ability to maintain a more stable sense of identity. Much like an individual nav-
igating familiar streets is able to walk more calmly and easily than one navigating an unfamiliar neighbourhood, Adam
is able to more easily navigate life as a gay man in Poland by reframing his identity as being more intimately tied to
cosmopolitanism than Polishness, even though doing so is by no means an easy task. As Miller-Idriss and Rothenberg
(2012) have aptly pointed out, people often have complex and at times contradictory relationships to the nation and
their national identity.
A number of respondents echoed Adam's sentiments. Mateusz, a 26-year-old doctoral student living in
Wrocław, told me (after I asked him what it meant to be Polish)
M: So, I'm cosmopolitan. I don't view myself as very Polish. I love Poland because I love the people I
know in Poland, I love Polish cities, I love Polish literature and culture and so on and so on, and
maybe this is being Polish. Being involved and being engaged in Polish culture, Polish society and
so on. In those terms, I am Polish [emphasis added].
Much like Adam, Mateusz does not completely eschew his Polishness. Yet despite acknowledging strong and
positive emotions for particular aspects of Polish culture, he very clearly identifies first and foremost as cosmo-
politan while still retaining a sense of his Polish identity. However, as his statement shows, it took a great deal
of conscious deliberation to arrive at this conclusion, as he initially claims to not view himself as very Polish.
Though Mateusz can and does identify as Polish, this process requires some redefinition in which he reframes
what being Polish means on terms of his own choosing. His immediate response, however, is still to state that
he identifies as cosmopolitan.
Romek, a 37-year old lawyer living in Krakow, shared similar ideas, yet claimed that his Polish identity came first.
“My identity is as a Pole in the first place. But equally or maybe just lower, I think I'm just a person of Western cul-
ture … a person who really shares the views of an open society with open values.”
Although Romek does not use this term in his response, he still underscores the importance of living in an “open
society,” which is one of the primary tenets of cosmopolitanism. Therefore, while Adam, Mateusz, and Romek all
have their own unique responses to the questions regarding their national identification, they all share a commitment
to cosmopolitan values.
A similar logic is evident in the following excerpt from my conversation with Kuba, a 30-year-old museum cura-
tor living in Wroclaw.
I: Would you say that you feel Polish?
R: Yes. I think … I think yes. I feel Polish, but my Polishness is written with a small letter, not
with a big letter, like Polish Poland and you even have to, you know, stand up when you
say Poland. No, for me Polishness is like the everyday life … so this is the way I would like
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to understand Polishness. Like that you know people and people know you, and you are not
available but eager to help some other people and to do something together.
Although Kuba does not identify as cosmopolitan, he has found a way to comfortably associate with Polishness
by reframing what it means to be Polish. Given this reframing, he is able to easily and quickly say that he feels Polish
when asked. As his statement makes clear, being Polish does not require displays of patriotism or national pride.
Rather, for Kuba, it is enough to be a good neighbour and everyday citizen, traits that he believes what should con-
stitute Polishness in the first place. Similar to Mateusz above, changing the stakes in this way makes it easier for him
to more easily and tacitly identify as Polish. Ewa, a 40-year-old former academic who now works at a small bank in
Warsaw, said something similar:
There are two purposes of patriotism … one is, you know, that national one, that sort of a big one.
And the other one is let's pay taxes, let's care about environment, let's be good to our neighbors, let's
support local, let's say, schools, libraries, communities. Let's support good causes and so on. And those
are forms of, let's say, they called modern patriotism, not war patriotism. And I could support it, but it
isn't specifically Polish … .so it's a citizen approach.
As Kuba and Ewa emphasise, being Polish can simply mean being a thoughtful and caring citizen, an idea that is
not, as Ewa states, specifically Polish. Ewa's sentiment is important, as it illustrates how one's Polishness need not be
constituted by one's adherence to a conservative and mythologised ideal, and emphasises instead the crucial place
of everyday actions happening in the present, actions nearly anyone can engage in. Reframing the basis of Polish
national identity in this way may therefore serve as a means by which Polish sexual minorities can find new meaning
in their national identity. With this newfound, reframed meaning, they can more easily and proudly identify with their
Polishness because it is now an identity they have defined on their own terms.
Such efforts at reframing national identity may also involve the strategic use of national symbols. Irma and
Maria, a lesbian couple living in Warsaw who both volunteer for a prominent local LGBT rights organisation, claimed
that embracing and reframing national symbols was one of the most important mechanisms by which sexual minori-
ties could salvage Polish national identity for themselves as well as other excluded minorities. However, as Irma's
statement makes clear, engaging national symbols in this way was not always easy for her.
I: My mother got me a Polish flag a few years ago, and I got it and put it in the back of room, like the
end of the basement. Because I didn't … like it was in my mind, I only imagined, you know, the
Right being nationalist with the flag. I didn't have the connection in my head that I could actually hang
it or hold it somewhere. And then a few years passed and I'm marching with a flag [emphasis added].
Irma had initially seen the Polish flag as an icon of exclusion, which did not elicit any positive emotions nor
afford any positive actions. Yet after some time, she found new meaning in the flag, which then allowed her to more
easily identify with and utilise it in public demonstrations. This reframing of a formerly oppressive symbol therefore
encouraged her to approach both the Polish flag and what it means to be Polish differently.
Irma and Maria then informed me that they had taken their mobilisation of the Polish flag even further by
stitching it to a rainbow flag, which they now display at various parades and pride marches. By reframing national
symbols in this way, Irma and Maria are also attempting to reframe Polish national identity to be more inclusive of
sexual minorities. Thus, in addition to finding ways to reframe what it means to be Polish in their own minds, some
are working to reframe the boundaries of Polish national identity through activism.
I: …We're mainstreaming the rainbow, showing that the Polish flag and Rainbow flag do not exclude
each other.
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M: That we are citizens as well.
I: We thought this was a great idea and mostly bigger demonstrations happened here in Warsaw. So
we basically --- really all of them wear their Polish flag and the rainbow flag showing that we're
here and we support you.
By engaging critically with salient national symbols, Irma and Maria are effectively doing what respondents like
Beata and Marcin believe needs to be done, reclaiming those national symbols and the national identity that they
represent that have supposedly been hijacked by the far right (Bourdieu, 1991; Verdery, 1993). For activists like Irma
and Maria, such acts of reframing are an important way to demonstrate that national symbols need not be under-
stood as signifying a strictly conservative national identity, but can be framed and understood as being inclusive of
sexual and other minorities.
4 | CONCLUDING REMARKS
While research on everyday nationhood has been instructive in showing the ways in which ordinary individuals navi-
gate and interpret the nation and national identity (Brubaker et al., 2006; Fox & Miller-Idriss, 2008; Miller-Idriss &
Rothenberg, 2012), it has not focused explicitly on how more vulnerable and stigmatised members of the ethnic
majority—what I have termed ideological others—navigate their relationship with national identity. My examination of
the experiences of Polish sexual minorities and their relationship to Polishness therefore serves as an initial attempt
to help broaden this literature. The interviews presented in this article call attention to the various ways in which the
nation is experienced and engaged with by a specific community of ideological others and demonstrate that while
national identification can indeed be a struggle for some, many others are working to reframe what their Polish
national identity means to them. Such reframing(s) can therefore make it easier for them to openly embrace their
Polishness and thus in some cases contribute to a renewed sense of ontological security (Skey, 2010), while also
directly challenging traditional and exclusionary models of national identity.
Although the analysis here is of a single target population (Polish sexual minorities), research focused on
national identification among ideological others is certainly not limited to this particular case. In addition to
focusing on different national contexts, research could also take a comparative perspective. In the case of
Poland, for example, fruitful comparisons could be made between levels of national identification among ideolog-
ical others and other members of the ethnic majority (such as Catholic Poles) or between different ideological
others (such as Polish feminists and controversial academics or activists). Further, the current study did not focus
on the extent to which other facets of people's identities (such as their social class and education levels) might
have impacted the ways in which they identified with the nation. By including these criteria, further studies
might be able to tease out whether and why certain communities struggle more or less than others with their
national identification.
Research could also move beyond examining a single case and examine the processes of national identification
among ideological others in different national contexts (such as sexual minorities in Poland and those in Hungary).
Such studies could also examine how these communities experience and interpret stigmatisation and discrimination.
Michele Lamont and colleagues (2016) have already made some very useful steps in this direction by examining
responses to stigmatisation in the United State, Brazil, and Israel among ethno-racial minorities. The primary differ-
ence between their work and what I am proposing, however, is that I am emphasising a focus on the experiences of
those who are stigmatised on ideological grounds, not due to their ethnicity and/or race.
Finally, research focusing on ideological others is not limited to exploring these communities' relationships to
national identity. While my aims here were to understand how Polish sexual minorities navigated their relationship
with Polishness, future researchers may want to examine the ways in which national projects create ideological
others, who is lumped into these groups, and why. A possible example could be an analysis of Turkey's recent purge
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of academics. In this case, scholars could focus primarily on elite-level discourses used to frame intellectuals and aca-
demics as being threats to the Turkish nation. Another relevant site of research would be contemporary Brazil, as
president Jair Bolsonaro has recently taken aim at intellectuals and academics who are at ideological odds with his
plans for the future of Brazil.
Of course, the chosen focal point of analysis will depend on the larger national context.
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ENDNOTES
2 In using the term “ideological” here, I do not mean that sexuality is meant to be seen as an ideology. What I am saying is
that the basis of exclusion for some, including but not limited to sexual minorities, is based on the idea that they do not
conform to traditional ideologies of the nation. They are therefore turned into ideological others. I am grateful to a reviewer
for helping me elucidate this distinction.
3 Thus, as Michael Skey has claimed, “a further issue that requires greater scrutiny is the notion of the ethnic majority”
(2010, p. 731).
4 This point follows McCrone's claim that “those on the margins…whether in national or ethnic terms, offer the social scien-
tist much better opportunities for understanding that identities are, in essence, negotiation codes used as people attempt
to steer paths through processes of acceptance and affirmation” (2002, p. 31). While this argument is well taken, such
research has yet to focus on ideological others.
5 Such “political homophobia” has become a focal point of research in political science concerned with the impact of
Europeanisation on a number of recent EU member states, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe (Ayoub, 2016; Mole,
2016; O'Dwyer, 2010).
6 Polish feminist activists and the “gender ideology” that they and others represent are therefore also often the targets of
such debates.
7 A recent article by Magdalena Mikulak (2019), however, has argued that despite the importance of the organisation, Faith
and Rainbow is largely assimilationist and therefore does little to challenge heteronormativity and traditional patriarchal
structures.
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